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RUSSIA’S LACK OF AMERICAN-STYLE
AGENCY PRINCIPLES: A PRIMARY CAUSE
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
TODAY
Keith Marshall*
OVERVIEW
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians found themselves
in a situation comparable to redesigning an aircraft in mid-flight:1 a
massive, poorly-functioning economy had to be redesigned before total
collapse. The first step was rapid, thorough privatization of formerly
state-owned entities, which set the stage for looting on an
unprecedented scale.2 Privatization created miniature oligarchs that
snatched up the majority of Russia’s wealth, and the corrupt loans-forshares program allowed them to turn millions into billions, almost
overnight, skimming fortunes off the top in the process.3 The second
step was a complete overhaul of the legal system, 4 but the legacy of
civil-law pandectic compounded the problems of privatization: the code
had no room for broad agency principles to protect companies and
shareholders.
The mini-oligarchs had little desire to protect
shareholders that legitimately acquired their interests, and corruption
and looting ran wild,5 due in part to the pandectic tradition’s rigid,
micro-focused legal system that precludes any doctrine of fiduciary
duty flexibly applied by judges. The drafters of the new civil code
* Keith Marshall is a joint JD/IMBA candidate at the University of South
Carolina School of Law and the Moore School of Business, class of 2013. He
holds a bachelor of liberal arts in two foreign languages, German and Spanish,
from Southern Methodist University, class of 2009.
1
Interview with Ronald R. Childress, Adjunct Professor, Univ. of S.C.
Sch. of Law, in Columbia, S.C. (Mar. 30, 2011) (Russians themselves have
used this comparison to describe their situation at the collapse of the Soviet
Union.).
2
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1731, 1733 (2000).
3
Id. at 1742-23.
4
See WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. MAGGS & GENNADY M. DANILENKO,
LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 12 (4th ed. 2009).
5
Black, supra note 2, at 1733.
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failed to consider the bigger picture, and, without agency principles, the
resulting failures of corporate governance should come as no surprise.
Part I of this paper introduces a metaphor that represents Russia’s
lack of agency principles. This paper then discusses the importance of
agency principles in corporate law. Next, the paper provides an
overview of pandectism and introduces the lack of agency principles.
Lastly, Part I provides a short history of Russian business forms and
discusses the privatization of Russian business in the early 1990s.
Part II discusses several examples of problems with Russian
corporate governance today then focuses on one particular problem.
Part III is the heart of this paper and discusses the lack of agency
principles in detail. Then, Part III analyses specific examples of the
lack of these principles and details other examples that may be used to
infer that the principles do not exist in Russian law. This paper calls
attention to a problem with Russian law and concludes that Americanstyle agency principles provide the best solution to this problem,
although other solutions exist.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. RUSSIAN CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE LAW: POTEMKIN VILLAGES
With the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(“USSR”) in 1991, the new Russia faced an economic crisis of historic
proportions; the Soviet economy was ill-equipped to function in a
modern world. To this day, Russia suffers problems stemming from
the Soviet-era and the rapid, forced transition to a market economy.
Businesses are plagued by poor management and constant theft by
directors. A major cause of this is the lack of adequate corporate law,
combined with the lack of enforcement of other laws.
Russian law can be compared to a “Potemkin village” in that
Russian corporate law presents a façade of adequate legal protection for
corporations and shareholders that in reality is insufficient. Grigory
Alexandrovitch Potemkin rose to prominence under Empress Catherine
II in the eighteenth century6 and was for seventeen years “the most
powerful man in Russia and as such one of the most powerful men in
Europe.”7 Potemkin is remembered as “one of Catherine’s many
6

JESSICA ALLINA-PISANO, THE POST-SOVIET POTEMKIN VILLAGE:
POLITICS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BLACK EARTH 3 (2008).
7
GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK, POTEMKIN: SOLIDER, STATESMAN, LOVER AND
CONSORT OF CATHERIN OF RUSSIA xi (1st ed. 1947).
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favorites, a particularly unsavory and extravagant character who
bamboozled the Empress during her trip to the Crimea by putting up
cardboard villages on the way and importing thousands of peasant serfs
. . . to create a picture of sham prosperity.” 8 The alleged creation of
hollow façades of villages overshadowed the real history, and the
phrase “Potemkin village” has come to signify a façade meant to
impress and mislead (i.e., to hide some undesirable fact or condition). 9
Many Russian companies mirror Potemkin villages: although the
companies function on the surface, many are façades for massive selfdealing by directors and managers. While the companies may function
for some time, the façades eventually come crumbling down as the
enterprises fail due to corruption and theft.
The body of law treating corporate governance problems is itself a
Potemkin village. Although the Civil Code of the Russian Federation
(“GK”), in its full pandectic glory, appears to cover all possible
justiciable situations, a glaring problem lurks behind the façade:
American-style agency relationships do not exist in any Russian body
of law. Directors do not work for the company; they are the company,
which allows for massive fraud and corruption.10 Unsupported by other
areas of the law, corporations, the public, and shareholders are
defenseless against looting by corporate directors, whose actions on
behalf of the corporation are not bound by agency principles. Russian
corporate governance has suffered greatly from this lack of proper
defenses.

B. THE ROLE OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES IN CORPORATE LAW
Agency principles are fundamental to American corporate law.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency (the “Restatement”) defines agency
as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act
on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” 11 Thus, agency
is important since companies must operate through its human

8

Id.
See, e.g., ALLINA-PISANO, supra note 2, at 3.
10
See Sergey Budylin, A Comparative Study in the Law of the
Ostensible: Apparent Agency in the U.S. and Russia, 16 CURRENTS: INT’L
TRADE L.J. 63, 67 (Summer 2007) [hereinafter Comparative Study].
11
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
9
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counterparts, the agents; for example, “a corporation’s CEO is its
agent.”12
According to the Restatement, the agent owes the principal a
number of duties.13 In general, an “agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship.”14 This concept is fundamental to corporate
structure in the United States: “Because it disallows the pursuit of selfinterest as a motivating force in actions the agent determines to take on
the principal’s behalf, compliance with the general fiduciary standard
reduces the likelihood that an agent will not comply with the agent’s
duties of performance.”15 The principles are legally binding guidelines
to ensure that the agent, e.g., a director, acts in the best interests of the
corporation. When this relationship does not exist, as in Russia,
numerous corporate governance problems arise.

C.

RUSSIAN PANDECTISM

To understand the reasoning behind the lack of American-style
agency principles, one must first understand the nature of Russian law.
The GK is, following the German civil code, a pandectic body of law. 16
Pandectism is a jurisprudential school of thought begun in the late
nineteenth century by German scholar, Friedrich Carl von Savigny,
who painstakingly organized Roman law to create a hierarchical system
of law, “within which every legal concept has a clearly defined
meaning.”17 The purpose of such a formalistic, hierarchical code is to
contain the entire body of law of the nation. 18 Max Weber described a
pandectic system as follows:
Present-day legal science, at least in those forms
which have achieved the highest measure of
methodological and logical rationality, i.e. those
12

Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
14
Id.
15
Id. at illus. 3.
16
See, e.g., Gábor Hamza, Continuity and Discontinuity of Private/Civil
Law in Eastern Europe After World War II, 12 FUNDAMINA 48, 61 (2006)
(“The new Russian Civil Code, like its predecessors, follows Pandectist
traditions with regard to both structure and terminology.”).
17
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in
Switzerland, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 301, 320 n.129 (2007).
18
Douglas Lind, Logic, Intuition, and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A.
Hart, 52 SMU L. REV. 135, 138-39 (1999).
13

2011]

RUSSIA’S LACK OF AMERICAN STYLE AGENCY
PRINCIPLES: A PRIMARY CAUSE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS TODAY

135

which have been produced through the legal science
of the Pandectists’ Civil Law, proceeds from the
following five postulates: viz., first, that every
concrete legal decision be the “application” of an
abstract legal proposition to a concrete “fact
situation”; second, that it must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract
legal propositions by means of legal logic; third, that
the law must actually or virtually constitute a
“gapless” system of legal propositions, or must, at
least, be treated as if it were such a gapless system;
fourth, that whatever cannot be “construed” legally in
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that
every social action of human beings must always be
visualized as an “application” or “execution” of legal
propositions, or as an “infringement” thereof.19
In summary, a pandectic code is a theoretically complete system of
law; thus, unlike their American counterparts, Russian courts cannot
make law, because the law is a “logically closed system wherein right
outcomes in adjudication were said to flow, by logical deduction, from
the generally applicable and definitionally complete legal rules and
principles found in the civil codes.”20 In other words, this system of
law allows judges little discretion in interpreting the law; 21 there is
simply no such thing as a case of first impression.22 Thus, the lack of
agency principles must be considered a systemic flaw, as the GK has
not prevented corporate governance problems.

D. AGENCY, PANDECTISM, AND THE GK
Since Russia follows the pandectist tradition of law, the GK is the
comprehensive collection of laws, even though more specific statutes
exist, including the Law on Joint-Stock Companies.23 Juridical person

19

MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 64
(Edward A. Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954).
20
Lind, supra note 18, at 139.
21
Id.
22
See WEBER, supra note 19, at 64.
23
Sergey Budylin, Going Beyond: The Ultra Vires Problem in Russian
Corporate Law, 2 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 128, 129 (2008) (citations omitted).
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or “legal person”24 is the Russian term for “company,” although there
are, of course, different forms, such as a corporation or limited liability
company. However, the problem for Russia is that American-style
agency cannot be found in the GK or anywhere in the entire body of
Russian law.
As shall be discussed in the following section, the privatization of
Russian businesses was a true shock to the system. “When the Russian
reformers set out . . . to create a modern market economy, . . . they were
up against a historical legacy the full weight of which was probably
poorly understood and the relevance of which was publicly denied.”25
In other words, Russia had significant momentum in a direction that
had little, if anything, to do with a traditional market, capitalist
economy.26 The privatization program managers hoped that, “[i]f the
general population could be turned into shareholders, they would also
become stakeholders in making the process irreversible.” 27 This
solution seems like a good way to help the new market support and
drive itself, but the full momentum of Russia’s non-capitalist history
went unrecognized.
Following the tradition of pandectism, a
comprehensive code of laws was promulgated,28 and the trust placed in
the managers to make the system work left the GK without proper
means to enforce shareholders’ rights. It was like saying that agency
principles would not be needed, because managers had to make the
system work. That did not happen as hoped.

24

GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 48, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 19 (“A legal person is an
organization that has separate property under ownership, economic
management, or operative administration and that is liable for its obligations
with this property and that may, in its own name, obtain and exercise property
and personal nonproperty rights, bear duties, and be a plaintiff and defendant in
court.”).
25
Stefan Hedlund, Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian
Privatisation, 53 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 213, 225 (2001).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 215.
28
See BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 12-13 (4th ed. 2009).
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E. BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIAN BUSINESS FORMS & THE ERA OF
PRIVATIZATION
To an American, the legal and practical history of Russian
companies would appear riddled with holes. Corporate law in the
United States has evolved over the years, changing through the courts
and the legislature to meet the needs of different eras. Corporate law in
Russia has changed little, not benefitted by the many years of evolution
and guidance of the courts as seen in the United States.
Pandectism is the reason for the static nature of Russian law;
there is simply no room for the courts to change or add to the law. The
pandectic tradition is plagued by a top-down approach, where the
legislature and other ruling bodies promulgate laws that all lower courts
and the public must follow: “Russian case law has always been an
instrument of power in the hands of the ruler.” 29 Laws are not created
through a democratic process and thus are unable to be tested by lower
courts, meaning the laws do not always “fit” in the context of the
system as a whole. In the United States, different corporate forms
came into being by necessity; companies needed to operate in a
particular way so the law evolved to meet those needs. 30 Margaret M.
Blair’s article, “Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,” emphasizes this stark
contrast and details why the corporate business forms were created:
Entity status under the law, and the associated
separation of governance from contribution of
financial capital through the formation of a
corporation, allowed corporate participants to do
something more than engage in a series of business
transactions, or relationships, or even projects. It
made it possible to build lasting institutions.
Investments could be made in long-lived and
specialized physical assets, in information and
control systems, in specialized knowledge and
routines, and in reputation and relationships, all of
which could be sustained even as individual
participants in the enterprise came and went. And
these business institutions, in turn, could accomplish
29

Hedlund, supra note 25, at 222.
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 38788 (2003).
30
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more toward the improvement of the wealth and
standard of living of their participants in the long run
than the same individuals could by holding separate
property claims on business assets and engaging in a
series of separate contracts with each other. 31
This is the epitome of legal evolution by necessity and is a far cry from
the “evolution” in Russia. The purpose of the newly developing
corporate law was to allow corporations to be built from the ground up
through the efficient accumulation of capital. 32 This, unfortunately,
was not possible in Russia, where the government found a sudden need
to privatize many entities that had already been operating for years
under state ownership. While U.S. laws evolved enough over time to
meet the needs of the entire country, Russian law had no time to
evolve, as it had to meet the present demands of huge, functioning
entities, so the pandectic model likely seemed the best approach.
Part of the problem is Russia’s inorganic legal growth. 33 Instead
of allowing the law to naturally evolve, Russia grabbed laws from
elsewhere to see if they would “grow.”34 “Well paid foreign
consultants would create laws for Russia that in many cases were
nothing but adaptations of existing German or US [sic] legislation”; 35
then, the USSR collapsed.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought massive, abrupt change
to the country in the form of privatization of eventually all businesses
that had previously been state-owned. The privatization began with
“voucher auctions,” during which managers gained control somewhat
honestly but instituted rampant self-dealing, which the government
failed to control.36 The later auctions proceeded with even less honesty
and centralized power in the hands of few, “who got the funds to buy
these companies by skimming from the government and transferred
their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired.”37 The results
of privatization were astounding:

31

Id.
See id.
33
Although this paper proposes that Russia needs to adopt agency laws
similar to American agency principles, this is not to say that there should be a
wholesale adoption; the laws need to retain their basic form yet be molded to
the needs of Russia.
34
Hedlund, supra note 25, at 216.
35
Id.
36
Black, supra note 2, at 1733.
37
Id.
32
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The largest Russian companies were sold in
massively corrupt fashion to a handful of wellconnected men, soon dubbed “kleptocrats” by the
Russian press . . . , who made their first centimillions
or billions through sweetheart deals with or outright
theft from the government, and then leveraged that
wealth by buying major companies from the
government for astonishingly low prices.
The
“reformers” who promoted privatization regretted the
corruption, but claimed that any private owner was
better than state ownership.38
Russia pursued a top-down, all-in approach to privatization, taking little
time to consider the real implications of what was happening.
However, Russians are not entirely at fault. So-called “shock
therapy,”39 a Western theory, which entails the “rapid decontrol of
prices, freeing of markets, and privatization of industry,” defined the
beginning of the era of privatization. 40 This period lasted from 1992
until around 1995.41 In a country as large as Russia, which was teeming
with companies set up by the Soviets, “shock therapy” was seen as
simply the only way to accomplish reform. 42 Thus, the voucher
auctions became the vehicle of choice to accomplish the task: “Citizens
would be given vouchers, which they could use to buy shares of
privatized companies.”43 In the beginning, managers owned a majority
of the shares, given as an incentive to not fight privatization. 44
Workers owned on average merely twenty percent, a “bow to the
Communist ideology.”45
Managers worked the system, often illegally, to gradually acquire
large stakes in their companies.46 Since the vouchers could be traded,
managers “illegally ‘privatiz[ed]’ company funds” to purchase
vouchers to trade for shares.47 These voucher purchases were not the
product of equal bargaining, with managers “convincing or coercing
38

Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1739.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1740.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1741.
47
Id. (citation omitted).
39
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employees to sell their shares cheaply.” 48 One strange feature of these
voucher auctions further helped managers gather shares: “[I]f fewer
vouchers were bid for a company’s shares, more shares would be
distributed per voucher.”49 This led managers to devise creative ways
to minimize the number of vouchers bid, including holding the auction
at a difficult-to-reach location, changing the location at the last minute,
miraculously making it impossible to travel to the set location, and
even barring bidders from the auction with armed guards. 50 However,
the corruption did not go unnoticed, and the privatizers knew “that
manager/worker control of privatized companies would limit
shareholder oversight of managers. They saw this as an acceptable
political price to pay for rapid privatization.” 51
The largest companies, including the major manufacturing, oil,
and gas entities, were treated differently:
[T]he government created pyramid structures,
bundling controlling stakes in a number of operating
companies into a few holding companies, and later
sold controlling stakes in the holding companies . . . .
Pyramid structures everywhere are an invitation for
controlling shareholders to siphon wealth from
companies that they control, but have a limited
economic stake in.52
The voucher auctions and subsequent illegal acquisition of shares
through “trades” set the stage for rampant corruption in the corporate
realm. Instead of incentivizing true managerial skills, the privatizers
unintentionally created a system in which the best managers were those
that could most artfully grab shares.
With the number of shares available for acquisition through
“trade” dwindling, ever resourceful crooks devised new methods to
steal shares, including “loans-for-shares” and blatant theft.53 In 1995,
48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1742.
52
Id. at 1741.
53
For example: “A story. The U.S. Government owes $25 billion to
Germany. To pay off the obligation, it gives $25 billion to Bank of America
with instructions to wire the funds to the German government. The money
never arrives. No one ever finds out where it went, or really tries to find out.
No one at Bank of America goes to jail. The government never asks Bank of
America to pay the money back, and the government continues to do business
49
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Vladimir Potanin proposed the “loans-for-shares” program with the
support of the new Russian banks: “The banks proposed to loan funds
to the government for several years, with repayment secured by the
government’s controlling stakes in these enterprises.” 54 Although this
sounds like a valid plan to jump-start an ailing government,
“[e]veryone understood that the Government would not repay the loans,
and would instead forfeit its shares to the banks that made the loans.” 55
The auctions to acquire these shares were an absolute sham:
The right to manage the auctions was parceled out
among the major banks, who contrived to win the
auctions that they managed at astonishingly low
prices. The bid rigging that was implicit in divvying
up the auction-managing role became explicit in the
actual bidding. The auction manager participated in
two separate consortia (to meet the formal
requirement for at least two bids), each of whom bid
the government's reservation price or trivially above
that. No one else bid at all.56
Those that acquired these shares became the managers and directors of
the companies at little cost, far less than fair market value. 57 Managers
could also acquire 30% of a firm’s shares at a discounted price with a
written agreement with the employees of the firm that the manager
would not allow the firm to go bankrupt for a period of one year. 58
This so-called agreement amounted to little more than a wink and a
nod, meaning “this was an all-but-open gift of a controlling stake to the
managers, in return for a phony agreement with the employees.” 59

with Bank of America. Indeed, the President invites Bank of America's CEO to
become a cabinet secretary, in charge of economic reform. For a time he
agrees, before deciding that there is more profit to be made by dealing with the
government than by helping to run it. This story isn’t remotely possible in the
United States. But change the bank to Oneksimbank (owned by kleptocrat
Vladimir Potanin), run the money not through Oneksimbank itself but through
two affiliated banks, and reduce the amount to $502 million, which is a rough
Russian equivalent of $25 billion as a proportion of GNP, and it becomes a true
Russian story, less widely known than it ought to be.” Id. at 1742-43.
54
Id. at 1744.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1746.
59
Id. (citation omitted).
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While the foregoing practices were slowly phased out near the
end of the era of privatization, the corruption continued unabated.
Before privatization, “[e]nterprise directors relied heavily on the
accumulation and use of personal connections or ‘pull,’ known
colloquially as blat,” to keep their companies running. 60 With the
increasing autonomy of privatized companies, directors had to evolve
their skills. The massive fraud during the era of privatization allowed
directors to acquire the majority stakes in their companies, which gave
these directors the “opportunity to appropriate the returns to the
relationships they had developed and cultivated under the previous
system.”61 Because “[m]uch of the relational capital was both
enterprise specific and person specific,” this meant that these directors
had to remain with the same companies and somehow keep them
afloat.62 Fortunately for the directors, the momentum of an economy
not based on traditional notions of supply and demand meant that little
was required of the directors in terms of managerial skills.
Appropriation, i.e., theft, had become easy: “The director had more
power than before; there were now fewer people to please. The
director could now directly appropriate the returns to investment in
relational capital.”63 Unbound by the fiduciary duties of agency law,
directors took advantage of the ailing system, and corporations
suffered.

II. THE REALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA TODAY
A. INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE LACK OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES HAS
CAUSED
Russia’s historically bad corporate governance trends continue;
the corporate form itself has become a Potemkin village. The laws
purport to create successful business forms, but the lack of Americanstyle agency principles and the lack of enforcement in other areas of the
law have allowed many businesses to become fronts for massive fraud.
Because no agency principles are in place to differentiate directors
from their companies, looting has become a commonplace occurrence.
The most significant problem is a shortened managerial time horizon,

60
CLIFFORD G. GADDY & BARRY W. ICKES, RUSSIA’S VIRTUAL ECONOMY
57 (2002) [hereinafter VIRTUAL ECONOMY].
61
Id. at 58.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 60.
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which has disincentivized long-term goals.64 Without the protection of
agency principles, companies are being forced to produce money for
immediate use or sequestration abroad rather than ensuring stable,
long-term growth.
In part, this is due to the past. The paradigm of pull has given
way to the paradigm of looting: “Under Communist rule, a good
manager often had to obtain the parts and supplies needed to keep a
factory running in unofficial ways. In a market economy, those skills
were easily transferred to the new tasks of asset stripping and selfdealing.”65 Another cause of these problems is the history and current
form of the economy itself. Due to necessity, the Russian economy had
become almost exclusively a barter economy. 66 While this barely
worked for the Soviet Union, modern Russia cannot survive as a barter
economy but, due to momentum, will have a difficult time becoming a
true market economy.
The problems today will not be solved in the next few years.
While the goals behind the large-scale privatization of Russian
enterprises were noble,67 path dependency slowed progress:
“[T]ransformation of a rules-based programme of privatization into
what Russians have called ‘prikhvatizatsiya’ (asset grabbing)
represented a path dependent institutional response to the drastic
change in rules that was implied by the collapse of the Soviet order.”68
This path dependent nature is a constant struggle in Russia’s fight to
solve its corporate governance problems.
Scholars and lawmakers disagree about what will solve Russia’s
problems, but the lack of American agency principles remains a
fundamental issue. Some argue that the problem is a lack of
64

Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Addiction and Withdrawal:
Resource Rents and the Collapse of the Soviet Economy 12 (Brookings Inst. &
Pa. State Univ., Working Paper December, 2006), available at
http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/addiction.pdf [hereinafter Addiction and
Withdrawal].
65
Black, supra note 2, at 1753 (footnote omitted).
66
See VIRTUAL ECONOMY, supra note 60, at 24 (“Throughout the
economy, transactions were occurring where either no payment of any kind was
made or the payment was in the form of goods rather than money.”).
67
Hedlund, supra note 25, at 214 (The purpose of privatization is to
improve corporate governance by “shifting power over enterprise decision
making from the bureaucracy to the market, [and thus] enterprise management
may be forced to improve performance.”).
68
Id. at 213.
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enforcement of good laws, not a lack of good laws, 69 but this position
places too much trust in pandectism. While the pandectic model
certainly may work, some overarching principles, such as agency, are
needed to create order. Those same scholars recognize the problems,
without proposing a proper solution:
We called the Russian company law that we helped
to draft a “self-enforcing” model because we thought
that stating sensible rules would encourage corporate
norms to coalesce around those rules (even with
minimal enforcement), and that the courts could
enforce simple procedural rules (for example,
approval of self-dealing transactions by noninterested
[sic] shareholders). Instead, self-dealing transactions
were hidden, courts were of little help even when
self-dealing was obvious, and managerial culture
coalesced around concealing self-dealing instead of
disclosure and a noninterested shareholder vote. 70
This comment belies the problems inherent with pandectism:
attempting to create “simple” procedural laws that cover every
justiciable situation leads to ignorance of the key principles that allow
systems of law to function properly.
What all of this means today is a host of problems, driven in
significant part by the fact that corporate directors are themselves the
company, not agents of the company. 71 While some law exists that
should minimize these problems, 72 the status of the directors of a
company as principals, not agents, cannot be ignored: there is ample
evidence that the directors themselves are the source of the problems in
Russia today.
69

Black, supra note 2, at 1755 (footnote omitted) (“Russia’s core
problem today is less lack of decent laws than lack of the infrastructure and
political will to enforce them. For example, the company law prohibits much of
the rampant self-dealing by managers and large shareholders that occurs every
day. But the courts respect only documentary evidence, which is rarely
available given limited discovery and managers’ skill in covering their
tracks.”).
70
Id. at 1756 (footnote omitted).
71
Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65.
72
See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF]
[Civil Code] art. 103, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last November 5, 2011)
(This article gives the stockholders general powers over the company, such as
the approval of accounting documents.).
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B. THE SHORT TIME HORIZON: POOR MANAGEMENT, LOOTING,
CORRUPTION, AND SELF-DEALING
The short managerial time horizon of many corporate directors is
a major problem today because it skews focus and rewards looting,
corruption, and self-dealing. In the transition from the Soviet economy
to a forced market economy, the paradigm became “take the money and
run.” This happened almost by laziness: when actual production of
wealth was centered on natural resources, “resource addiction” to oil
and gas created major problems when booms ended and rents
decreased.73 “[A]ddiction leads to short-time horizon—inability to
think long-term. . . . This leads to an inability to implement reforms.” 74
When the era of privatization left the oil and gas rents in the hands of a
small number of people, the rest of the country’s directors were left
with two options that persist to this day: steal from the company or
actually increase its value, which was, and still is, much more
difficult.75
Theft became the easiest option for those managing the company.
Since directors and officers are the company, they can actively steal,
and courts will not enforce the existing laws that purport to protect
corporations and shareholders.76 Directors “were expert[s] at [looting];
and it was sure to produce a handsome profit that could be tucked away
overseas beyond the reach of a future Russian government.” 77 The
effect snowballed:
[M]any managers who started out honest changed
their minds, because they saw what their fellow
managers were able to get away with; the tax system
demanded that profits be hidden (which made them
easy to steal); they saw the Mafia and dishonest
managers becoming wealthy while they struggled to
73

Addiction and Withdrawal, supra note 64, at 2.
Id. at 12.
75
Black, supra note 2, at 1736.
76
Id. at 1756.
77
Id. (For example, “Bank Menatep (controlled by kleptocrat Mikhail
Khodorkovski) acquired Yukos, a major Russian oil holding company, in 1995.
For 1996, Yukos’ financial statements show revenue of $8.60 per barrel of
oil—about $4 per barrel less than it should have been. Khodorkovski skimmed
over 30 cents per dollar of revenue while stiffing his workers on wages,
defaulting on tax payments, destroying the value of minority shares in Yukos
and its production subsidiaries, and not reinvesting in Yukos’ oil fields.” Id. at
1736-37 (footnote omitted)).
74
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survive; and the authorities were too corrupt to do
anything about obvious theft. Others, discouraged by
the hostile business environment, sold out to crooks
who could earn a swift return on investment in ways
that honest managers couldn’t. Honest and dishonest
behavior alike can be contagious, and Russia fell into
a dishonesty equilibrium.78
This is where Russia sits today, stuck in an equilibrium that
incentivizes theft and corruption, because the law is either incomplete
or unenforced.
In the United States, one way for a company to thrive is to please
shareholders by maximizing profit. The reward for profit maximization
comes in the form of approval of a higher salary. The U.S. system is
not perfect, but such widespread corruption also does not exist likely
due to its system of “true” agency.
The primary goal of Russian directors differs greatly: “do not
make a profit that can be observed.”79 This may be counterintuitive to
Americans, but this method allows the company to shelter its earnings
from high taxation.80 The problem is that it also allows directors to
steal from the company without authorities or shareholders noticing. 81
This is not to say that continuous theft is possible. “Suppliers and
employees can’t be defrauded indefinitely, even if they have no legal
recourse. Sooner or later, they will stop doing business with the
firm.”82 Thus, the current iteration of a looting scheme involves a
mixture of profit maximization and theft of the firm’s value. 83 One
might ask why the market would not trend more towards profit
maximization; but, this assumes that the managers in charge have the
requisite skill, and the uncertain future of the market makes actual
profit maximization more challenging. Possible future sanctions
further complicate the situation:
Thieves who will be caught if they linger too long
won’t capture the firm’s long-term value anyway. An
amoral [director] then has a sharp choice: create
value (perhaps with self-dealing at a level unlikely to
78

Id. at 1767 (footnote omitted).
VIRTUAL ECONOMY, supra note 60, at 67.
80
Id. at 66.
81
Black, supra note 2, at 1767.
82
Id. at 1751.
83
Id. at 1752.
79
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lead to sanctions), or steal as much as you can and
then flee the jurisdiction.84
Two important factors for the short time horizon are economic and
political uncertainty;85 a future government could choose to enforce the
rules or might even add American agency principles. This increases
the challenge of profit maximization, which, in turn, increases the
incentive to steal in the short run. Poor management skills compound
all of these problems.86
This system can be taxing, both literally and figuratively, so
shareholders end up with little of the company’s value and have few
means to effect change. Informal taxes are a major hindrance to proper
allocation of capital between the firm, its management, and its
shareholders.87 Bribes constitute a major portion of lost profits, as
bribes must go “to tax inspectors, to customs officials, to the police not
to harass you, to the many bureaucrats from whom you need a permit to
operate,” etc.88 The past few years have changed little; Putin
transformed “the previous rent-sharing schemes into a single, centrally
run scheme . . .—requiring constant investments by oligarchs to protect
property rights.”89 For example, the oil stabilization fund should
overflow with profits, yet it received only 14 percent of the total
rents.90 The rest “is distributed throughout the economy in other forms
to different claimants. The owners of the resource companies—the
oligarchs—keep a healthy amount as profits.” 91 This is the definition of
looting, and agency principles should prevent this self-dealing and
stabilize the market.

84

Id. at 1751.
Id. at 1765.
86
Id. at 1764.
87
This includes “(1) bribes paid to government officials; and (2)
payments made for the support of public sector needs that are nominally
voluntary but in fact mandatory for businesses, for example, payments made by
enterprises to support the social sector of towns and regions, cultural programs,
philanthropic giving, and so on.” CLIFFORD G. GADDY & BARRY W. ICKES, THE
VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED: RESOURCE RENTS AND THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 3
(2006) [hereinafter VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED].
88
Black, supra note 2, at 1759 (footnote omitted).
89
VIRTUAL ECONOMY REVISITED, supra note 87, at 4.
90
Clifford G. Gaddy, The Russian Economy in the Year 2006, 23 POSTSOVIET AFF. 38, 40 (2007).
91
Id.
85
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There is ample documentation of the problems surrounding
Russian corporate governance. This paper indicates a major source of
the problems but barely scratches the surface in terms of hard evidence.
While the lack of agency principles is certainly not the only cause of
the problems in Russia today, it is a significant cause nonetheless. The
lack of agency principles manifests itself in a number of ways; the short
time horizon is one major issue that must be overcome, because it is the
basis for other issues, specifically looting and self-dealing.

III. RUSSIA’S LACK OF AMERICAN-STYLE AGENCY PRINCIPLES
A. AGENCY PRINCIPLES CANNOT BE FOUND IN RUSSIAN LAW
Unlike the codes of the United States or any state, the GK lacks
principles that are truly similar to agency law. Further, U.S. corporate
law differs from Russian corporate law in a significant way: “the CEO
of a Russian company (also known as [a] director . . . ) is not normally
viewed as a representative or agent of the company; rather he is a
company’s ‘governing body’ controlled by corporate law.” 92 Thus,
managers aren’t working for the company as agents; they are the
company (principals)—this is the main difference between American
and Russian corporate law. If an agent is supposed to “act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,” 93 what
happens when the person acting for the corporation is not acting on
anyone else’s behalf and is not subject to anyone else’s control? The
director becomes a miniature oligarch of his or her organization, which
allows, and even incentivizes, theft from the company. For example,
the Restatement states that an “agent has a duty . . . not to use property
of the principal for the agent’s own purposes.” 94 The lack of this
fundamental doctrine in the GK could create serious problems, for
example, if other principles were not enforced.
92
Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 67; see also Federal’nyi Zakon
RF ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh [Federal Law of the Russian Federation
on Joint Stock Companies], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 1996, No. 1, Item 1, art. 69, translated in WILLIAM E.
BUTLER, RUSSIAN COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION 277 (2003) (“A
one-man executive organ of a society (director, director-general) shall operate
in the name of the society without a power of attorney, including represent its
interests, conclude transactions in the name of the society, confirm the
personnel establishment, and issue orders and give instructions binding for
execution by all workers of the society.”).
93
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
94
Id. § 8.05.
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Consider another example: Russian directors often act with
reckless disregard for the best interests of the company, knowing that
their time to make (i.e. steal) money is limited. The existence of
agency principles would set up a standard of care to prevent this from
happening. “[A]n agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care,
competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar
circumstances.”95
Someone familiar with Russian corporate
governance practice might note that the standard of care is in fact theft,
so this provision would have to be adapted to the unique status of the
Russian corporate environment. The Restatement further provides that:
An agent has a duty, subject to any agreement with
the principal, (1) not to deal with the principal’s
property so that it appears to be the agent’s property;
(2) not to mingle the principal’s property with anyone
else’s; and (3) to keep and render accounts to the
principal of money or other property received or paid
out on the principal’s account.96
This further reinforces the commitment to preventing theft from the
company, but this concept is only possible under true agency. This
cannot work in Russia, because a director cannot be distinguished from
the principal.
The Russian pandectist will counter that there are laws that cover
these very situations, but the problem with this argument is that the
laws that protect shareholders are not enforced or are too weak. 97 This
is where agency principles should help to limit the ability of directors
to harm the corporation and its shareholders. This is not related to
apparent agency or ultra vires actions—the issue is the director himself
or herself as an agent of the corporation. The American lawyer will
then ask the pandectist where he or she can find principles that link
directors to the corporation through agency. The pandectist might point
to a number of provisions, but these provisions only look like, but are
not in reality, agency. Through global research, I found no link
between Russian corporate directors and agency. Similarly, the
personal research of Ronald M. Childress, 98 which entailed a systematic
95

Id. § 8.08.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 (2006).
97
Black, supra note 2, at 1756.
98
Ronald M. Childress is a University of South Carolina School of Law
professor and former director of Project ROSCON and the Rule of Law
Consortium in Moscow.
96
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review of Russian Supreme Court and Supreme Commercial Court
explanations (“rulings” (postanovleniia) or “informational letters”),99
revealed only a limited number of pronouncements that could even
remotely be compared to American paradigms.
The American lawyer may then ask himself or herself whether the
lack of agency principles is actually a problem. The pandectist would
deny that a problem exists, but the problem may be seen with a quick
reflection on the basic tenets of pandectism. Because agency principles
are not found in the GK, judges will not read them into the law, which
American judges often do, inventing entire bodies of law not found in
any statute, ordinance, etc. Russian judges will not even recognize the
existence of agency principles as we know them—there is not even a
proper Russian word for agency in the GK. To a pandectist, this is not
a problem, because the GK theoretically covers all possible justiciable
situations. Only the Federal Assembly—the Russian legislature, with
the Duma as the primary entity—really “defines” what can be an issue
or problem before the courts, because courts will only consider issues if
they fit the narrow definitions found in the codes.100
Since other portions of the GK and portions of the applicable
corporate laws are either not enforced or are too weak to support a
healthy corporate environment, the lack of agency principles is a direct
cause of the problems with corporate governance. The problem is
circular: because agency principles are not in the GK, courts will not
recognize them; but, because courts will not recognize and create them,
the problem cannot be solved. And, since it is unlikely that courts will
undergo a true paradigm shift away from pandectism, the best solution
will be for the legislature to rewrite the laws to include agency
principles to protect shareholders.
The problem for American lawyers trying to understand this
system is that we want a real answer: a “yes” or “no,” followed by a
“because,” such as a court saying “we do not recognize American
agency principles, because our system provides adequate protection for
shareholders.” But, the closest thing an American lawyer can get to an
answer is something like the informational letter and ruling discussed
below, where the court circles around the topic, never actually
99

See BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 22 (“The purpose of explanations is to
authoritatively interpret the law and instruct the entire court system concerning
its application. Explanations are addressed directly to the lower courts and
often instruct them to interpret and to apply specific rules of law in a specific
matter.”).
100
Id. at 9.
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mentioning or disclaiming agency. Therefore, this behavior is our “no”
to the question of whether agency principles exist and is also a “yes” to
the question of whether there really is a problem, because, as was
shown in Part II, the problems today are significant and numerous.

B.

EVIDENCE OF THE LACK OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES

Although the explanations do not actually mention a lack of
agency, the discussions and principles behind them may be used to
infer that agency principles do not exist. One informational letter,
Number 144 (18 January 2011), of the RF Supreme Commercial
[Arbitrazh] Court discussed “the presentation of information upon
demand by participants in limited liability companies and by
stockholders”101—a concept American lawyers know as shareholder
inspection rights. In the context of inspection of corporate records, the
basic agency premise is that inspection rights exist to protect the
shareholders, the owners of the company, by allowing them to monitor
the directors, the agents of the corporation.102 This informational letter
supports the proposition that true agency principles do not exist in
Russian law. Without agents, as the term is used in the United States,
there is no need to provide thorough inspection rights, because there is
no one from whom the shareholders must be protected. Further,
transparency of a company is limited, meaning the mini-oligarch
directors are able to hide more from investors/participants, thus making
it easier to steal.
The informational letter states that, in “accord with Article 91(1)
paragraph one of the Joint Stock Company statute, stockholders (a
stockholder) holding no less than twenty-five percent of company

101

Informatsionnoe Pis’mo Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF
“O nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki rassmotreniya arbitrazhnymi sudami sporov
o predostavlenii informatsii uchastnikam khozyaystvennykh obchestv” [The
Highest Commercial Court of the Russian Federation Informational Letter on
Several Questions of Practice in Commercial Court Consideration of Disputes
On Presenting Information to Participants in Commercial Companies], VESTNIK
VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA RF [VESTN. VAS] [The Highest Commercial
Court of the RF Reporter] 2011, No. 144 [hereinafter Informational Letter].
102
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) (citing Cincinnati
Volkablatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189-201, 48 L. R. 732, 78 Am. St.
Rep. 707, 56 N.E. 1033 (1990)) (“The right of inspection rests upon the
proposition that those in charge of the corporation are merely the agents of the
stockholders who are the real owners of the property.”).

152

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 8.1

voting shares have a right of access to accounting documents.” 103 This
shows just how weak shareholder inspection rights are: to inspect
corporate records, one must own at least twenty-five percent of the
company. Even combined, shareholders cannot access the information,
unless at least one shareholder in the group has the requisite twentyfive percent.104 This would be considered ludicrous in the United
States. In Delaware, “[a]ny stockholder . . . shall, upon written demand
under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right . . . to inspect for
any proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from: (1) The
corporation’s stock ledger, . . . and its other books and records.” 105
A shareholder may not even find out who can participate in the
stockholders general meeting, unless he or she owns at least one
percent of the company:
[T]he list of persons having the right to participate in
the stockholders general meeting shall be presented
by the company for familiarization upon demand of
persons included on the list and possessing no less
than one percent of the votes. . . . In connection with
this, stockholders not included on the list or not
possessing more than one percent of the votes in the
aggregate, do not have the right to demand
presentation to them of such list . . . .106
Imagine if this were the case in the United States for a large company
with a market capitalization of, e.g., $150 billion: a shareholder would
have to own at least $1.5 Billion worth of shares, just to see who is
accountable for the important decisions made at the shareholders
general meeting. Thus, for large companies in Russia, this is a
significant barrier to shareholders trying to monitor the company’s
performance. The corresponding provision of the Delaware Code
reads: “Such list shall be open to the examination of any stockholder
for any purpose germane to the meeting.”107 As the U.S. Supreme
103

Informational Letter, supra note 101, ¶ 17.
Id. (“Besides this, court should keep in mind that in a case when a
stockholder, having less than twenty-five percent of company voting shares,
has applied to court with a claim to compel a joint stock company to present
documents of account reporting and/or their copies, his claim is not subject to
being satisfied even if this stockholder has earlier applied to the company with
an appropriate demand together with other stockholders and the aggregate share
[is] no less than twenty-five percent of company voting shares.”).
105
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010) (emphasis added).
106
Informational Letter, supra note 101, ¶ 19.
107
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (West 2009).
104
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Court stated in Guthrie v. Harkness, shareholder inspection rights are
grounded in agency principles,108 so the lack here of proper inspection
rights is evidence that agency principles do not exist in Russia.
On April 2, 1997, the RF Supreme Court Plenum and RF Supreme
Commercial Court Plenum set forth ruling number 4/8, “On Some
Questions in Applying the Federal Statute on Joint Stock
Companies.”109 The court stated:
A decision by the board of directors (board of
overseers) or executive agency of the joint stock
company (individually or collectively) may be
disputed in a judicial proceeding by presenting a law
suit to deem it invalid as in cases when the possibility
of [such] dispute is contemplated in the statute
(Article 53, 55 and others), as in the absence of an
appropriate directive, [or] if the decision does not
meet the requirements of the statute and other
normative law acts and violates stockholder rights
and statutorily protected interests. The defendant in
such case is the joint stock company.110
In the United States, this is known as a shareholder derivative suit and
is based on agency principles.111 Normally, such a suit alleges that the
directors or officers violated their fiduciary duties to the company. 112
This did not transpire in the Russian court. In this ruling, the courts
defined a concept, very common and fluid in the United States, in
108

Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905).
Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF i Vestnik Vysshego
Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF “O nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniya federal’nogo
zakona ‘Ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh’” ot 2 aprelya 1997 g. [The Russian
Federation Supreme Court and Supreme Commercial Court [Joint] Plenary
Ruling on Some Questions in Applying the Federal Statute on Joint Stock
Companies of Apr. 2, 1997], BIULLETEN’ VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF [BVS]
[Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 1998, No. 3/5
[hereinafter Ruling on Joint Stock Companies].
110
Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis in original).
111
Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding
Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 144 (2007) (“In a derivative
lawsuit, the plaintiff shareholders theoretically act in the interests of all
shareholders, thus employing a legal mechanism to address agency problems
that exist between shareholders and management.”).
112
Id. at 145.
109
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extremely static terms: the suit can only be brought if specifically
contemplated by statute, in the absence of appropriate directive, or “if
the decision does not meet the requirements of the statute and other
normative law acts and violates stockholder rights and statutorily
protected interests.”113 This ruling stems from the pandectic nature of
Russian law. The court is not willing to allow any fluidity in the law,
which would have bolstered shareholders’ rights. The last part reduces
our idea of violations of shareholders’ rights, an agency issue, to a
basic statutory violation. This compounds the problem, because these
very laws are not enforced by the courts. Thus, shareholders have
almost no chance of vindicating their rights, unless the law specifically
mentions what can be challenged if allegedly violated.
Ruling 4/8 supports the proposition that agency principles do not
exist. By limiting the situations where shareholders may institute
derivative suits, the court is saying that there are limited situations
where directors or officers have done something wrong. In the United
States, this involves violations of fiduciary duty principles, a subset of
agency.114 Because the Russian directors are the corporation, they are
not independent persons that can be sued on behalf of the corporation
for wrongful acts. Thus, the mechanism to solve agency problems is
limited simply because it is not needed under the law. Shareholder
derivative suits are not needed if it cannot be recognized that the
directors violated some duty.
The informational letter and ruling exhibit a common theme:
shareholders have few rights to inspect and question the actions of the
corporation. The informational letter showed that there is a high bar to
inspect corporate records, and the ruling showed that only in narrow
circumstances may shareholders challenge actions of the board or other
executives. The second plays off of the first: to know something is
truly wrong, shareholders must inspect the corporate records, meaning
there is, at the least, a two-step bar to the vindication of rights. This is
real evidence of a lack of agency principles, despite the fact that both
the informational letter and the ruling failed to mention agency in any
form. With few shareholder checks on their power, directors have been
able to exploit the companies for which they work, stealing billions in
the process.

113
114

Ruling on Joint Stock Companies, supra note 109, ¶ 10.
Ferris, supra note 111, at 144.
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C. SIMILARITIES TO AMERICAN AGENCY PRINCIPLES AS EVIDENCE OF THE
LACK THEREOF
A number of passages in the GK resemble the American agency
concepts of principal and agent or govern situations that would, in the
American paradigm, require application of agency principles.
“Representation” seems to be of the same mold as the concept of a
principal and agent relationship;115 however, it is much narrower and is
different as applied.116 Like a Potemkin village, “representation”
purports to be agency but is without any substance to truly make it
agency. GK Chapter 10, Article 182 reads:
A transaction made by one person (a representative)
in the name of another person (the person
represented) by virtue of a power based upon a power
of attorney, a provision of a statute or an act of a state
agency of local self-government empowered thereto
directly creates, changes, or terminates the civil law
rights and duties of the person represented.117
“Power of attorney” is a common translation, meaning this article
applies most often in the context of the attorney-client relationship.118
The concept of “representation” is a much more static representation of
legal rights, not dynamic like our system. For example, Chapter 10,
Article 185 requires that the “power of attorney” be a “written
authorization issued by one person to another person for representation
before third persons.”119 Thus, “representation” is really a transaction,
or occurrence-specific contract, which differs greatly from our
principal-agent relationship.

115

See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF]
[Civil Code] art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR
AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75.
116
Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 66.
117
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75.
118
Id.
119
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76.
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One might argue that a director could be considered a
representative under the last sentence of Article 182, which states that
this authority “may also arise from the circumstances in which the
representative (salesperson in retail trade, cashier, etc.) acts.” 120
However, “while the Civil Code leaves open the list of cases where
authority may be inferred from a situation, in fact the above-mentioned
cases (a salesman and a cashier) are practically the only instances
where such ‘inferred’ or ‘implied’ authority is recognized.” 121 Russian
courts, unwilling to stray from the pandectic model, will likely not hold
that a director is a representative. Ruling that a director is a
representative of the company would in fact be a major change for
Russian corporate law, because Chapter 10, Article 186 states that the
“term of a power of attorney may not exceed three years.” 122 Thus,
directors and officers would be required to sign new employment
contracts every three years for this provision to work like agency.
Further, only directors, and perhaps officers, may sign a power of
attorney on behalf of a company, meaning directors and officers could
not themselves be representatives.123 This strengthens the proposition
that agency principles do not exist, because under the concept that most
closely resembles agency, a director cannot be a representative; thus,
the director certainly cannot be an agent.
Another problem is the means to challenge a power of attorney.
Article 189 of Chapter 10 states that only the grantor of the power of

120
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF]
[Civil Code] art. 182, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil
Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR
AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 75.
121
Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 66.
122
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 186, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76.
123
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept. 1996 at 76 (“A power of attorney in the
name of a legal person shall be issued under the signature of its manager or
other person authorized for this by the founding documents, with an attachment
of the seal of this organization.”). This provision might even strengthen the
need for agency relationships, because, theoretically, a director could assign
himself a “power of attorney” saying that the company would transfer all of its
assets to him. Thorough research has revealed no examples of this actually
occurring, but it is certainly possible.
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attorney can challenge the transaction.124 But, would a company
challenge the actions of a director in granting the power of attorney?
The answer is likely no, especially since the rights of shareholders to
institute derivative suits are very weak.
Several articles of Chapter 25 of the GK mimic another American
agency concept, respondeat superior. According to the Restatement,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an “employer is subject to
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the
scope of their employment.”125 However, respondeat superior “is
inapplicable when a principal does not have the right to control the
actions of the agent that makes the relationship between principal and
agent performing the service one of employment.” 126 Thus, this
American doctrine presumes that the employee is in fact an agent and
encompasses all acts that might occur during employment.
Chapter 25, Article 402, states the Russian equivalent in terms of
“obligations”: “Actions of employees of the debtor in performance of
its obligation shall be considered to be actions of the debtor.”127 An
“obligation” is when “one person (the debtor) is obligated to take for
the use of another person (the creditor) a defined action.” 128 Although
this appears very similar to respondeat superior, the Russian version is
much narrower and does not truly contemplate an agency relationship.
The liability of an employee arises here with regard to a specific
transaction or occurrence and does not reflect the ongoing employment
status. True American-style agency would be the adoption of liability
throughout the ongoing employment status, but this provision is limited
to one specific instance.129 The problem is that the employee owes no
124

GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 185, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct.- Sept. 1996 at 78.
125
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
126
Id. at cmt. b.
127
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 402, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 6, Nov. - Dec. 1996 at 63.
128
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 307, translated in Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, 32 STAT. & DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS
SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 6, Nov. - Dec. 1996 at 35.
129
It should be noted that the RF Labor Code (TK) governs employment
law-relationships, so the theory of ongoing respondeat superior is governed by
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duties outside the context of the particular transaction, meaning the link
to American agency principles is weak. The essential difference from
American agency principles is that the Russian approach is static and
mechanistic.
Another instance in which Russian law differs from American
agency principles is Chapter 49, the title of which is often translated as
“Commission”130 and sometimes translated as “Agency.”131 Article 971
states:
1. Under the [commission] one party (agent) shall
undertake to perform certain legal actions on behalf
and at the expense of the other party (principal). The
rights and obligations under the transaction
completed by the agent shall accrue directly for the
principal.
2. A [commission] may be concluded with reference
to the period during which the agent has the right to
act on behalf of the principal or without such
reference.132
This seems to be the perfect setup for concepts similar to American
agency principles, so one would think that the rest of the Chapter
actually contained agency principles, but it falls short. First, “agent” is
sometimes translated as “attorney,”133 which shows how narrow this
Chapter might truly be; this would conform to the pandectic goal of
specificity. “Agent” is not likely the proper translation, 134 so this
Chapter could not actually match American agency principles.

an entirely different body of law. Further, my research revealed no provisions
of the RF TK that might support the proposition that American agency
principles exist, albeit outside the RF GK.
130
See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF]
[Civil Code] ch. 49, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL
LEGISLATION 465 (1999).
131
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 49, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
132
Id. § 971 (“contract of agency” changed to “commission,” which is
likely a better translation).
133
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 972, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 466
(1999).
134
For example, another translation uses the word “delegate” instead of
agent. By avoiding the word “agent,” most translations seem to be implying
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Second, even if “agency” is the proper translation, the duties
mentioned in Article 974 do not establish any duties similar to those of
American agency principles:
The agent [is required]: to perform the [commission]
given to him in person, . . . ; to communicate to the
principal all information about the progress of the
execution of [commission] at his request; to convey
to the principal without delay all the things received
under the transactions, performed in pursuance of the
[commission]; to return without delay to the principal
the [power of attorney] whose validity term has, not
expired upon the execution of [commission] or in
case of the termination of the [commission] before it
is executed and to submit a report with appended
covering documents, if this is required by the terms
and conditions of the contract or the character of
commission.135
None of these duties include any sort of fiduciary duty, so, even
assuming that this Chapter could apply to company directors in the
form of agency, it would be useless to solve the corporate governance
problems.
Although Chapter 49 likely relates to attorneys and power of
attorney, Chapter 51, titled “Commission” 136 or “Commission
Agency,”137 is similar to American agency in that it presupposes the

that this is not agency in the American sense. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 48, translated in Peter B.
Maggs & A.N. Z Zhiltsov, Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 32 STAT. &
DEC.: THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES, no. 5, Oct. - Sept.
1996 at 328.
135
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 974, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011) (several words
or phrases replaced with better translations).
136
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 51, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
137
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 51, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 473
(1999) (the title of this chapter might simply contain “Agency” to differentiate
it from Chapter 49, which the author titles “Commission,” meaning “Agency”
might not be meant to parallel the American term).
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ability of an “agent” to make purchases. However, this Chapter more
closely mirrors contract law regarding the sale of goods; for example, it
mentions the ramifications of incomplete performance, 138 failure or
refusal to perform,139 etc. It should also be noted that nowhere does
Chapter 51 mention power of attorney. These concepts are a formulaic
approach to contract law, with no place for an agency concept like
fiduciary duty. This Chapter also fails to rise to the level of American
agency principles in that no real duties are mentioned. Chapter 52
follows a similar pattern.140
The title of Chapter 52, Article 1005 is often translated as
“Agency Contract.”141 This article deals with what Americans would
call an “undisclosed principal” and “disclosed principal.” 142 While this
might be a slight incorporation of American agency principles, there is
certainly no fundamental incorporation of agency law. 143 The contract
is far narrower than in the United States and cannot pertain to directors
of a company, because the principal may not be a juridical person.
Thus, while adopting a feature similar to American agency principles,
Article 1005 is not in fact “true agency.” It should also be noted that
this article might pertain specifically to the shipping industry and have
less in common with broad agency principles. 144 This would fit the
specificity goal of pandectism. The title of Chapter 52 is sometimes
translated as “Agency Service”145 or “Shipping Agency Service,” 146
and the title of Article 1005 is sometimes translated as “The Brokerage

138
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 995, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
139
Id. § 1004.
140
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 52, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
141
See, e.g., Comparative Study, supra note 10, at 65.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil
Code] art. 1005, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011); see also
Агентирование, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#ru|en|
Агентирование (last visited July 14, 2011).
145
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 52, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
146
Агентирование, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#ru|
en|Агентирование (last visited July 14, 2011).
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Contract.”147 Although these translations are not dispositive and no
other supporting references could be found, this chapter might deal
exclusively with shipping and, if not, is still not a true incorporation of
agency principles.
While Chapter 4 details what American attorneys would think of
as normal partnerships, Chapter 55 covers a “simple partnership.” 148
The simple partnership allows several people to pursue profit or some
other legal purpose jointly without forming a juridical person.149 This
Chapter comes very close to exhibiting principles similar to American
agency principles but also falls short. For example, Article 1043 states
that the “obligations of the partners to maintain their common property
and the procedure for the reimbursement of expenses relating to the
discharge of these obligations shall be determined by the contract of
[simple] partnership.”150 This seems to say that partners, as agents of
the partnership, owe the other partners fiduciary duties. However,
instead of creating an agency relationship, this article turns a potential
fiduciary duty into a contract right that shall only exist if specifically
included by the partners in their contract.151 Article 1045 even appears
to support the proposition that this Chapter is similar to agency: it
provides that all partners have rights of inspection of the partnership’s
documents.152 As previously discussed, the relationship between
agency principles and shareholder inspection rights is that the
inspection rights exist to protect the shareholders, by allowing them to
monitor the directors (agents).153 Thus, by allowing all partners to

147

GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1005, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
148
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
ch. 55, translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN CIVIL LEGISLATION 499
(1999).
149
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1041, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
150
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1043, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
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Id.
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GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1045, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/ (last visited July 14, 2011).
153
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) (“The right of
inspection rests upon the proposition that those in charge of the corporation are
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inspect the records of the partnership, the GK seems to imply that
agency principles exist in some form. However, the implication is lost
on the rest of the Chapter, as no real duties are created.
In summary, while a number of articles in the GK appear to be or
come close to being American-style agency principles, the code lacks
true agency principles. This does not mean that the GK completely
ignores agency; to the contrary, the articles discussed above might
show that the drafters of the Code recognized agency principles, but
purposefully chose not to include such broad concepts. Thus, the
provisions that are similar to agency reinforce the proposition that real
agency principles do not exist in Russian law. Why would such
overarching principles be needed when the pandectic model of this
code should account for all possible justiciable situations? The answer
is that they technically would not be needed, but this answer fails to
recognize the real, practical problems caused by this lack of agency.
The failure lies with the inherent problems in creating a pandectic code
of laws from scratch, where the prevailing practices in the preceding
years differed so greatly. The drafters, even with help from abroad,
were simply not equipped to create the necessary code of laws. The
problem persists today because Russia has become so entrenched in the
pandectic model. The greater problem is what was shown in Part II:
the lack of agency principles has transcended legal and scholastic
bounds and has caused real life problems.

IV. CONCLUSION
This paper should not be read to infer that the drafters of the GK
intended to deprive shareholders of their rights, as this is not the case.
The drafters had good intentions, but, with the micro-level focus of
pandectism, they missed the macro-level protection offered by agency
principles.
So, what happens next? A number of important questions remain.
What will happen in the future? How can the existing problems be
solved? Are individual directors at fault, or should we blame history?
How can Russia be taken off its current path, which likely will lead to
self-destruction of the corporate structure as a whole?
The overall solution might be a continuation of the pandectic
theme, i.e., a top-down approach: “For both already privatized and notmerely the agents of the stockholders who are the real owners of the
property.”).
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yet-privatized firms, Russia needs a serious, top-down effort to control
corruption, organized crime, and self-dealing.”154 Although a number
of scholars hold this view, the answer is not so simple. One possible
solution to fix corporate governance issues is twofold: 1) adopt
American agency principles, and 2) strengthen the requirements of
founding documents so that directors cannot escape liability. This
remains an oversimplification though. Massive reform is needed. In
addition to the foregoing, Russia needs better measures to counteract
corruption and self-dealing, perhaps through new tax or corporate laws
to disincentivize self-dealing through strong penalties.
Although other solutions may exist, the adoption of American
agency principles could prove to be the easiest, most effective solution.
Simple procedural laws have failed; despite provisions against selfdealing, courts consistently refuse to hold directors liable. Perhaps
broader, thematic provisions are needed that would rewrite the role
corporate directors play. Agency principles could even take the form
of constitutional laws, which could aid enforcement.
These problems raise the broader issue of the desirability of
pandectism in general. Some of the corporate governance problems
today might be caused in part by the nature of a pandectic code: it
might simply be more difficult to litigate under such a comprehensive
code than under a system like the United States. The difficulty of
litigation might manifest itself in lower success rates of those trying to
challenge companies but lacking the resources a company has to defend
itself. Similarly, this difficulty might deter litigation altogether due to
the complexity of the code and number of provisions that must first be
followed. The basic pandectic concept of trying to cover all possible
justiciable situations might have created a monster that defies all but
the mightiest challenger.
However, Russia will not likely stray from pandectism in the near
future—this would be a major paradigm shift, therefore, the Potemkin
village of corporate law must be dismantled and rebuilt as a whole
“village.” Current laws allow for the creation of a façade: companies
appear to be functioning, but, behind the wall, directors are skimming
profits until the company fails. History cannot be ignored though, and
it must be recognized that the current generation of leaders may be
incapable of reform. Path dependency is a major problem for Russia,
and it is highly likely that only time will heal the wounds. Perhaps the
best option for the current leaders is enact American agency principles
154

Black, supra note 2, at 1798.
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and let implementation occur naturally. Since the Russian market
cannot be forced to act in a certain way, the best move might simply be
to equip future leaders with the proper tools to succeed, and the
adoption of true agency principles is the proper tool.

